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Abstract: This treatise highlights the recent dreams and dialogues of African Renaissance and the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).  These dreams and dialogues have been driven 
as much by Afro-optimism as by Afro-pessimism, by both the positive and the negative political and 
economic changes that have taken place in postcolonial Africa. The paper briefly surveys the 
resurgence of the idea of the African renaissance in the 1990s and the foundation of NEPAD at the 
turn of the 21st century. It then reviews the ingredients of the NEPAD policy document with the hopes 
for African redemption. This is followed by an assessment of NEPAD initiatives, focusing on the 
reality of its formulation, implementation and ownership. The essay concludes by trying to profess the 
future of Africa and the continent’s alternative efforts to find solutions to its peoples’ problems. 
 
Key words: NEPAD, African Renaissance, African Union, Omega Plan, Millennium Africa 
Renaissance Programme, New African Initiative 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Different strategies have been adopted by the African leaders since the second half of the 
twentieth century to collectively lead the continent out of political and economic misery. 
These strategies range from zonal, regional and continental, the recent one being the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). This initiative was adopted almost at the 
same time when OAU dropped its initial ‘O’ to remain with the two final letters. All those 
initiatives notwithstanding, Amuwo (2002: 69) argues that Africans are worse off today 
materially than they were at nominal independence, and the majority of those 1.2 billion 
people the World Bank says live on less than one US$ per day are found on the continent.  
 
As last year we commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization of African Union 
(OAU)/African Unity (AU). marking half a century since it was created on 25 May 1963, we 
think we should take this opportunity to assess the New Partnership for African 
Development - NEPAD, enquiring on what is new in this new partnership. The discussion in 
this treatise concentrates on vacuums existing in the NEPAD document taking into account 
the existing socio-political African setting to draw a conclusion and suggest working 
recommendations. It should be noted that the African political economic environment has 
been undergoing evolution with time. The evolutionary atmosphere of the continent has 
mainly been filled with consciousness of its people with painful memories of suffering, 
struggle, and survival against the historical ravages of slavery, colonialism, and 
neocolonialism, as well as a desire for sustainable development (Nunn, 2008). Slavery and 
colonialism have been regarded by many Afro-centrists, including Ifeanyi (2013) and Nunn 
(2008) to be the cause of the current state of African economies. 
 
In an attempt to address such adversities, African statesmen have effected a number of 
institutional changes at the continental level, especially at the turn of the 21st century, among 
which being the transformation of the OAU into the AU (Apuuli, 2012: 136; Sithole, 2012: 
111) and the formation of a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This paper 
presents an assessment of the latter’s decade-or-so-old efforts (NEPAD initiative) to 
strengthen Africa’s profile and role in the international community. It focuses on NEPAD 
policy document aiming to define a far-reaching common denominator for African states in 
their collective developmental aspirations within the context of globalization. The paper 
seeks to address the following key questions: Does NEPAD––a program adopted by the 
(O)AU and endorsed by virtually all international agencies and bilateral donors––present a 
genuinely new model of development that avoids the shortcomings of previous 
development plans? Is it a real tool for advancing prosperity in the continent? 
 
NEPAD: WHERE DID IT COME FROM? 
Following the attainment of political independence in the mid- and late twentieth century 
African states have experimented with numerous projects of economic and development 
initiatives at the continental level. As per Mahmudat Olawunmi Muhibbu-Din (2011: 1). 
these initiatives range from the New International Economic Order in Africa (1975 to 1977). 
through the Monrovia Strategy (1979) that culminated in the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (1980 
to 2000) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980). to Africa’s Priority Program for Economic 
Recovery 1986–1990 (APPER) which later converted to the United Nations Program of 
Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery 1986–1990 (UN-PAARED). Other prominent 
strategies include the Abuja Treaty of 1991, the Africa Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Program for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation 1989 (AAF-SAP). the 
African Charter for the Popular Participation for Development 1990, and the United Nations 
New Agenda for the Development of Africa 1991 (UNN-NADA) (ibid). The recent 
continental policy document is the NEPAD, which is partly a way to achieving the African 
Renaissance.  The 21st century mission to identify common aims and objectives among 
African countries by means of policy documents namely ‘the African Renaissance’ and 
‘NEPAD’ has to be directly linked to the practical role played by former South Africa’s 
President, Thabo Mbeki.1 With the rebirth of black African rule South Africa in the 1990s, the 
country started exerting its influence (or flexing its muscles) on Africa, “either actively 
assuming or sometimes passively receiving a leadership role far beyond its borders” 
(Melber, 2002: 186). It was Thabo Mbeki who coined the slogan “African Renaissance” 
during the late 1990s. This idea is to a certain degree rooted in various elements of earlier 
African philosophical discourses on Pan-Africanism, Negritude, Ubuntu, and Black 
Consciousness (Melber, 2002: 187).  
 
Thabo Mbeki believed that the African Renaissance had begun in the political sphere. 
Africa’s history therefore demanded that Africans must do everything in their power to 
“defend the gains that had been achieved”, to encourage all other countries on the continent 
to move in the same direction “according to which the people shall govern, and to enhance 
the capacity of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to act as an effective instrument for 
peace and the promotion of human and people’s rights to which we are committed” (Mbeki, 
1999: 211-212, Kotze and Steyn, 2003: 40). 
                                               
1 Thabo Mbeki’s voice was among the loudest in promoting NEPAD around the globe. His role in the project is 
examined in detail in Ian Taylor’s “NEPAD and the Global Political Economy: Towards the African Century or 
Another False Start?”, in J. O. Adesina, Yao Graham, and A. Olukoshi (eds.). Africa and Development Challenges 
in the New Millennium: The NEPAD Debate, CODESRIA, Dakar, 2005, p. 64-65. 
 
According to Mbeki, the African Renaissance was the third moment in Africa’s 
contemporary historical cycle that is dated from the 1950s (and more specifically from 
Ghana’s independence 57 years ago). The “first moment” was Africa’s rebirth after years of 
colonialism and exploitation by foreign powers - the period of the liberation struggles of the 
immediate post-Second World War years, which culminated in the continent’s political 
liberation. The “second moment” dates to the end of the Cold War in 1989, which resulted in 
the collapse of the socialist community of states. This historical event gave rise to “the 
resurgence of more open political and economic interaction on a world scale…. and 
manifests itself in campaigns for democratization in independent African countries”. In this 
regard, South Africa’s political liberation from the minority whites in April 1994 was one of the 
climaxes of Africa’s “second moment”. The “first and second moments”, however, serve as 
dress rehearsals for the African Renaissance “which has a far broader and deeper agenda 
than political liberation and democracy” (Mbeki, 1999: 210). The African Renaissance project 
is praised by some analysts ( such as Melber, 2002: 187) for its contribution in revitalizing the 
values considered and appreciated as both genuinely African and human (in the sense of 
“civilized” as opposed to the derogatory views of “primitive”). Accordingly, it managed to 
consolidate a philosophical foundation dating back to the first attempts at breaking loose 
from the Eurocentric dominance of the industrialized Western world of Africa’s colonizers. 
In their view, the project managed to rally policy makers, bureaucrats and intellectuals alike 
behind the notion of African self-respect, dignity and pride based on previous achievements 
(ibid). Nevertheless, the concept failed to materialize as a fully fledged and concise new 
paradigm. It essentially failed to establish a political concept and instrumental strategy in 
practical policy matters. 
 
The translation of the African Renaissance into policy concepts and programmes to some 
extent led to the gradual phasing out of the phrase itself within the predominantly political 
public discourse. Its systematic introduction into the international arena may be dated to the 
briefing on the “Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme” (MAP) provided by Thabo 
Mbeki to the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos on 28 January 2001. In his 
presentation, he qualified MAP as “a declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to 
take ownership and responsibility for the sustainable economic development of the 
continent.”  
 
Mbeki was supported by his colleagues Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Benjamin Mkapa of 
Tanzania and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, although the latter had still his own ideas (the 
Omega Plan for Africa). which were made known at a later stage. The MAP document 
originated during a process that had begun in 1999, when the South African, Nigerian and 
Algerian presidents were mandated by the Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya, to 
approach Africa’s creditors on the total cancellation of Africa’s external debt. The presidents 
were tasked further by the South Summit in Havana in April 2000 to convey the concerns of 
the South to the G8 Summit in Okinawa (July 2000). The OAU Summit in Togo (July 2000) 
mandated the same presidents to prepare the Millennium African Recovery Programme 
(Melber, 2002: 188; Gelb, 2002: 1; Tawfik, 2009: 64; Muhibbu-Din, 2011: 1–2). 
 
At the Conference of Ministers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) in Algiers (8–10 May 2001). the South African government presented the 
‘Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme’. On that occasion, Abdoulaye 
Wade, then Senegalese President, presented the ‘Omega Plan for Africa’ and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) presented a ‘Compact for African 
Recovery’. It was decided that the documents should be tabled in a merged version to the 
OAU Summit in Lusaka (Melber, 2002: 188). The Omega Plan for Africa and MAP were 
finally merged into the New African Initiative (NAI). the final draft of which was eventually 
unanimously adopted by OAU Heads of State at their Lusaka Summit meeting on 11 July 
2001 (Gelb, 2002: 1–2; Adesina, 2005: 35; Taylor, 2005: 76–77). and “was internationally 
endorsed as Africa’s official development strategy through a resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly” (Melber, 2006: 5). This diplomatic compromise, aimed at 
reconciling different interests and approaches in a face-saving manner, prevented the 
initiative(s) from ending in a cul-de-sac at the early stage. Subsequently, on 23 October 2001 
after a meeting in Abuja of an Implementation Committee of Heads of State, the modified 
NAI document was renamed as “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)” 
(Melber, 2002: 189, Kotze and Steyn, 2003: 40–41). The current President of Algeria and the 
then Heads of State of Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa were at the forefront of this 
movement (Taylor, 2005: 63; Kotze and Steyn, 2003: 41) and were involved in the initiative 
since its early stages.2 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEPAD POLICY DOCUMENT 
As per Article 1 of the NEPAD policy document (2001). “[t]his New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development is a pledge by African leaders based on a common vision and a firm conviction, 
that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both 
individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the 
same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic” (NEPAD, 2001: 1; 
Amuwo, 2002: 70; Landsberg, 2012: 52). The same Article emphasizes the “common vision 
and a firm and shared conviction” of African leaders to anchor the programme in “the 
determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of 
underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world”. Article 7 goes on to claim that, 
“African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and 
political leadership”. With reference to the continent’s painful historical experience of 
impoverishment, it postulates as a lesson in Article 27 that “Africans must not be wards of 
benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment”. 
This latter emphasizes the ownership claim previously articulated by Thabo Mbeki and 
defines “a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world … based on the agenda 
set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to shape their 
own destiny” (Article 48). Article 49 constitutes the African leaders’ declaration aimed at 
achieving the aforesaid objectives. Accordingly, the leaders are supposed to take a joint 
responsibility to: strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution 
and ensure that they are used to restore and maintain peace; promote and protect democracy 
and human rights by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and 
participative governance; restore and maintain macroeconomic stability by developing 
standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies and appropriate institutional 
                                               
2 They were latter joined by another ten African states (Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principé, and Tunisia) on an Implementation Committee. See Henning 
Melber, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – Old Wine in New Bottles?”, Forum for 
Development Studies (NUPI). Vol. 29, No. 1, June, 2002, p. 189. 
frameworks. Leaders are also jointly responsible for instituting transparent legal and 
regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of private companies and the 
public sector; revitalizing and extend the provision of education, technical training and 
health services (with priority to HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases); 
promoting the role of women in social and economic development; building the capacity of 
the state in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework and maintain law and order; and 
promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification. 
 
Other joint responsibilities include poverty eradication in Africa and the promotion of the 
role of women in all activities. They constitute NEPAD’s long-term objective (Article 67). 
Ensuring Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of above 7 percent for the next 15 years 
and fulfillment of the agreed International Development Goals (IDGs) (Article 68). 
 
Moreover, NEPAD identifies three areas as pillars for sustainable development. These are: 
(a) peace, security, democracy and good governance (Articles 71–85); (b) economic and 
corporate governance, with a focus on public finance management (Articles 86–92); and (c) 
sub-regional and regional approaches (Articles 93–98). According to Funke and Nsouli (2003) 
the above elements are core to achieving NEPAD’s objectives. However, Funke and Nsouli 
put much stress on the areas of governance, private sector development, regional and global 
economic integration and the development of pro-poor sectors such as health, agriculture, 
infrastructure and education as pivotal in achieving the goals. 
 
Concomitantly, “mobilizing Resources” (NEPAD, 2001: 36–49 i.e. Article 147–173) comprises 
the core of the project. It puts forward the measures to be taken to realize the targets within 
the priority sectors. A rather sobering but realistic assessment begins this discussion. To 
achieve the target of 7 percent annual growth rate, “Africa needed to fill an annual resource 
gap of 12 percent of its GDP, or US$ 64 billion” (Article 147). The elements needed to achieve 
this are identified in the same Article as increased domestic savings, improved public 
revenue collection, and, most importantly, funds from outside the continent. Thus, NEPAD 
“focuses on debt reduction and Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as complementary 
external resources required in the short-to-medium-term, and addresses private capital flows 
as a long-term concern”. Notwithstanding these declarations, the challenges remain to 
achieving results that will contribute meaningfully to sustainable development. 
 
Reading the document with a critical eye one can observe that it sounds like an unworkable 
‘white-elephant’ project merely made up of ‘wishful thinking’. This can be viewed even in the 
minds of the drafters themselves who had realized this well in advance. Pessimistic as they 
were, they stressed that “unless something new and radical is done, Africa will not achieve the 
IDGs and a 7-percent annual GDP growth rate” (Article 70). While this sounds more down to 
earth, the document fails to spell out clearly enough what it considers as the “something new 
and radical” in its endeavor (Melber, 2002: 192). 
 
Related to the above, there is the issue (un)preparedness and somewhat belongingness that 
revolved around the minds of the architects of NEPAD.  The initiative was brought to life by 
few elites on behalf of the many, without the consent of the many. At one point, Melber 
quotes Thabo Mbeki as saying: 
 
We now have an urgent responsibility to develop implementable plans, to 
ensure that the excellent programmes and policies that exist on paper succeed 
in practice, that African technical expertise from within Africa and the 
diaspora is harnessed to convert those programmes and policies into practical 
and implementable programmes and projects, that the African people come to 
own these programmes as belonging to them (2002: 193). 
 
A NEPAD Critique: Prospects, Challenges and Failures 
It is at least rhetorically unquestionable that the NEPAD initiative was welcomed 
wholeheartedly by African Heads of State and Government. However, the practicality of the 
initiative has been uncertain right from the onset. The most critical areas in the NEPAD 
initiative include its relationships with the African Union and other key African 
organizations, the question of ownership as many Africans feel it is a foreign imposed 
initiative, the political review component African Peer Review Mechanism (Shilimela, 2004: 
i). democratic governance and human rights ethos (including the fight against corruption) 
conflict management, and leadership crises. 
 
The AU/NEPAD Relationship 
NEPAD was established as a fully integrated organ of the African Union developed to 
achieve the fourteen objectives (as outlined in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act) that aim at 
realizing economic growth and overcome poverty (Akume and Abdullahi, 2012). halt 
marginalization of the continent in the globalization process (Mamman-Sabba, 2011) and 
promote good governance in all its dimensions (Akokpari, 2003). In liaison with the AU 
Commission NEPAD has access to the African diaspora networks elsewhere outside Africa 
with a view to make the diaspora contribute to the African development (UNECA, 2012). 
and acts as the AU’s instrument of integrating Africa into the world economy (Bunwaree, 
2009). It also acts as a force towards achieving the long awaited dream of the United States of 
Africa (UNECA, 2012).  
 
In the context of the debate over the African institutional relationships, Chris Landsberg 
(2012). a scholar from University of Johannesburg, has raised anxiety over the AU-NEPAD 
link, observing that it has harmed the prospect of the regional economic and political 
integration. The more or less parallel adoption of NEPAD and the final transformation of 
OAU into AU simultaneously resulted into a serious problem of institutional rivalries.3 
Consequently, “the relationship between AU and NEPAD has exposed competition over 
status, scarce financial and human resources, policy influence and petty squabbles amongst 
diplomats and officials. The tensions between these poorly anchored and weakly 
consolidated institutions and initiatives have prompted some to suggest that NEPAD needed 
to be fully integrated into AU and to fall under the command and control of  AU as premier 
body” (Landsberg, 2012: 50, 52). 
 
Who Owns NEPAD and NEPAD for Whom? 
                                               
3 NEPAD was established some nine months before the AU, but controversially, it is the AU that officially owns 
NEPAD. See Chris Landsberg, “The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD): Restoring a Relationship Challenged?”, in African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012, 
p. 52. 
The question of ownership of NEPAD constitutes a brainteaser. The NEPAD document 
recognizes the problem of leadership and ownership as obstacles in setting continent-wide 
development programmes. The document affirms that past attempts “to set out continent-
wide development programmes” have not succeeded, in part because of “questionable 
leadership and ownership by Africans themselves.” While NEPAD (Article 51) admits that 
“The New Partnership for Africa’s Development will be successful only if it is owned by the 
African peoples united in their diversity”, the African elite, foreign governments and donors 
have far too much influence and control over NEPAD, and this has contributed significantly 
to NEPAD’s legitimacy problems in Africa.  
 
With very few exceptions, there is little knowledge about NEPAD among the African 
peoples. Since its ratification in Lusaka, in July 2001, much has been happening in form of 
workshops, conferences and seminars on NEPAD strategies. But most of such activities have 
been for the government officials along with representatives of donor agencies and other 
members of international community with a wide variety of interests in the plan ((Shilimela, 
2004: 1). Its promoters have been marketing it on the international arena, particularly 
popularizing it to donors, while little has been done to popularize it among the civil society 
in Africa. For the critics, NEPAD has brought about a major dichotomy: abroad it is generally 
celebrated and respected; in Africa it has brought about divisions and suspicion (Landsberg, 
2012: 62). 
 
Furthermore, the NEPAD document itself is somewhat self-contradicting. On the one hand, 
the document stresses for Africa’s development future to be in the hands of the Africans 
themselves (Article 44). and on the other hand, it exposes itself to former colonialists’ 
influence and interests as the programme financing depends heavily on foreign capital for its 
implementation, and it does not say how it will match people-centered development with 
private sector-led growth (Anangwe, 2002). It will not be wrong for one to suggest that 
NEPAD was just created to act as a kneepad to support the knees of African leaders and 
political elites when begging for and taming the big financial flow coming forth to support 
the programme.  
 
As a matter of fact, right from the start, South Africa’s then President, Thabo Mbeki, 
presented NEPAD to the G8 for the first time because he and other promoters of NEPAD 
believed that Africa could only develop though partnership and cooperation with the 
developed world. This was to get support for NEPAD from developed countries, which they 
in fact got, as Bunwaree (2009) argues that NEPAD gets massive assistance from the G8. 
Accordingly, $56 billion of the $64 billion needed by NEPAD every year is to come from 
donors (Shilimela, 2004: 7). In lieu of soliciting for internal means to combatting African 
miseries NEPAD continues to embrace and old dependence syndrome. 
 
Concomitantly, China also claims to support NEPAD and AU (Tull, 2009: 326). However, 
Beijing’s support to those institutions “has so far proven little more than rhetoric and is 
ambivalent at best” (ibid: 340). Perhaps President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Africa will 
redesign China’s support to the continent’s initiatives. Nevertheless, we are pessimistic of 
the Chinese undertaking in Africa. It is obvious that the era of old colonialism (political 
occupation) is gone; but it has been replaced by economic (neo) colonialism whose tentacles 
include foreign direct investment with the central motive of net transfer of profit. China 
cannot be an exception in this political economic drama. Being an emerging superpower 
industrially China is just one among the many Africa’s resources competitors under the 
multipolar international order.  
 
B. Onimode (as cited by John Ohiorhenuan, 2002: 9) rightly has this to say: 
 
The salvation of Africa lies primarily in Africa and with Africans themselves. 
Optimism must become a resounding virtue and widely disseminated 
psychological trait – even in the face of challenges... Robust optimism about 
Africa’s future is a major requirement for the self-confidence that Africans so 
badly need to deal with the challenges of this historical juncture. Regardless of 
what Africa’s detractors may say or do, Africans themselves must never lose 
faith in their own capacity and ability to change the course of events – to 
achieve the willed future for themselves.  
 
THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM) 
One important, but also contentious, dimension of NEPAD that is frequently credited is the 
creation of APRM. The main activity of APRM has been the negotiation of selected members’ 
adherence to a peer review process “by which African heads of state exercise some form of 
surveillance over their colleagues in a bid to ensure good governance” (Akokpari, 2004: 244). 
This surveillance is exercised not only over their internal economic stewardship, but also 
over their progress toward public participation and governmental accountability (Melber, 
2006: 8; Zartman, 2009: 228). On one hand, the mechanism has been encountering resistance 
and criticism from many African politicians. On the other, APRM has again been criticized 
by NEPAD’s donors for excluding the political review. What are the appropriate actions that 
can be taken if one African country or a NEPAD member country fails to maintain a good 
standard of governance? Firstly, already there are NEPAD member countries which are 
offensively involved in conflict. For example, Rwanda and Uganda, members of NEPAD, 
have intervened in war inside their neighbouring country, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Africans and their development partners appear to be divided on the type of actions 
to be taken if one African (not only NEPAD) country misbehaves (Shilemela, 2004: 4). 
 
NEPAD AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Related to APRM is NEPAD’s aspect of good governance. It is clearly stated that “The New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development has, as one of its foundations, the expansion of 
democratic frontiers and the deepening of the culture of human rights” (Article 183). A good 
political governance initiative as enshrined in NEPAD policy document therefore, calls on 
African governments to respect the global standards of democracy, which include political 
pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties, workers’ unions, and fair 
and open democratic elections periodically organized to enable people to choose their 
leaders freely.  
 
However, questions remain about the quality of democracy in the continent. By the time of 
preparing this paper, most of the African countries have hardly ever met the level of 
electoral democracy, let alone the promotion and protection of human rights. The electoral 
processes and election results in the region have frequently been contested as neither free nor 
fair, some of which have been accompanied by violence. Such miserable elections occurred in 
Cote d’Ivoire (2010). Kenya (2007 and 2013). Zimbabwe (2008). Tanzania (2010). Uganda 
(2010). and Nigeria (2012) to mention but a few.  
 
As regards political pluralism, most African ruling political parties have increasingly 
developed enmity with the opposition parties. While ruling parties have been enjoying their 
power of incumbency, opposition parties and their leaders have been facing the iron hand of 
the power in place. Victoire Ingabhire, a popular opposition leader in Rwanda, for example, 
has recently been imprisoned on allegedly genocide, divisionism and terrorism accounts, on 
the ground of documents found on Wikipedia.4 Wilfred Lwakatare, opposition leader from 
CHADEMA was put in remand custody on charges of terrorism, the charges that were 
disapproved by the Court of Law5. Much the same can often be said about the frequent ill-
treatment of Dr. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda’s Forum for Demcratic Change (FDC) opposition 
icon in Uganda. A malfunctioning legal system, undemocratic governance and a constrained 
freedom of expression and of the press are the orders of the day in Africa. 
 
Borrowing from Bayart’s words (2000). NEPAD is not less than a “make-believe game” or 
the “export of institutional image” played by the African elites to the international 
community. Using the financial resources they have accumulated during long years of 
plunder, the African power-holders (washika-hatamu) have trickily been able to maintain their 
positions. With these funds, they can purchase the support of some key political opponents, 
and finance the creation of a plethora of small parties calculated to divide the opposition 
(Bayart, 2000: 225). The ‘transition to democracy’ has actually been reduced to no more than 
a technique of self-preservation by various ‘anciens regimes’. The paths taken by Tanzania, 
Uganda, Cameroon and Zimbabwe from the early 1990s to date provide an adequate 
illustration of this ‘fictitious’ democracy, the aim of which being an attempt to attract foreign 
aid and avoid sanctions by the West. “Africans are … always ready to turn external 
constraints into some new creation” (Bayart, 2000: 240). 
 
It is also declared in NEPAD (in Articles 83 and 188) that African leaders will undertake 
“effective measures to combat corruption and embezzlement” and “set up coordinated 
mechanisms to combat corruption effectively” as well as ensuring a return of” Africa’s stolen 
“monies” lodged in offshore banking vaults. However, experience shows that there is an 
uncontrolled increase in grand-corruption and Africa’s monies are incessantly flied to the 
elite coffers in Europe and America. As a result, “both external private and public capital 
flows are drying up. This is a no-win situation” (Amuwo, 2002: 75). 
 
NEPAD AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and ensuring 
that they are used to restore and maintain peace is one of the joint responsibilities the African 
leaders vowed to fulfil (as per NEPAD Article 49). This being the case, there emerges a 
growing consensus that dependence on the extra-continental community to resolve Africa’s 
internal problems is an extremely dangerous option for Africa. For this, one needs to look at 
the Libyan crisis in 2011, which clearly exposed this danger. Why did Africa fail to resolve 
                                               
4 You may wish to refer to the joint motion of the European Parliament released on 21.05.2013, Doc. B7-0247/2013 
5 Tanzania Daima 10.05.2013 
the conflict which erupted in February 2011 in Libya? On 10 March 2011, the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC)6 established an AU ad hoc High-Level Committee composed of five 
heads of states of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Congo, Mali, South Africa, Uganda, 
and the Chairperson of AU Commission. The Committee was directed to see that there is an 
immediate cessation of all hostilities, cooperate with the competent Libyan authorities to 
facilitate humanitarian assistance for the needy, protection of foreign nationals, and the 
adoption and implementation of political reforms. On 17 March 2011, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1973 authorizing “the use of all necessary means 
to protect civilians, enforce a ceasefire order and no-fly zone against Gaddafi’s forces in 
Libya”.7 Thus the military intervention in Libya, authorized by the UNSC, obstructed the 
efforts of AU to put into practice the notion of “African solutions to Africa’s problems” 
(Apuuli, 2012) to end the civil war and make possible progress towards democratic change. 
Much the same can be said of the political crisis in Mali8, whereby the French ‘peace-
building’ mission has an upper hand. Moreover, Africa’s failure to stop the recent (early 
2013) coup d’etat in the Central African Republic adds insult to an injury on NEPAD 
peacekeeping initiative. 
 
DOES AFRICA HAVE THE RIGHT LEADERSHIP? 
Perhaps an even more challenging task is the view that Africa’s success through NEPAD 
depends on AU’s ability to enforce upon itself high standards of political leadership and seek 
to establish and adhere to a common set of values that must include respect for democracy, 
good governance, human rights, and accountability of leaders before their citizens. Congo’s 
President Dennis Sassou-Nguesso, Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema, Sudan’s 
Omar Hassan al-Bashir, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and others who came to power through 
coup d’etats, and are still in office to date, seem to contradict NEPAD’s commitment to 
taking a harder line on a wider range of unconstitutional forms of governance. 
 
It may also be correct to argue that NEPAD was an elite statesmen’s initiative, thus it did not 
take roots not only to many African leaders but also to the subsequent generation of African 
leadership. Melber (2006: 5) is of the idea that NEPAD architects do not comprise an alliance 
free of self-interest and particular agendas”. It will not be wrong to suggest therefore that the 
agenda the framers of NEPAD sought to push had two consequences. One, it carried with it 
the seeds of the further marginalization of the majority Africa’s peoples. , Two, it granted a 
highly privileged segment of African elites the potential to benefit from the globalization 
process (Taylor, 2005: 66). This elite fraction wanted to continue to enjoy international 
financial and business networks. It is interesting to note that the three countries in Africa 
(Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa) that happened to be among the key promoters of NEPAD 
had been receiving the most foreign direct investment (FDI) between 1993 and 1998 (Taylor, 
2005: 71).  
 
                                               
6 The PSC is the AU Organ established in 2002 for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in 
Africa. 
7 The full text of UNSC Resolution 1973 is available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/2011/03/libya-arab-
states-resolution-2. 
8 The political situation in Mali has been unstable following the Tuareg separatist aborted attempt to overthrow 
the country’s constitutional government in March 2012. See Alexis Vines, “A Decade of African Peace and 
Security Architecture”, in International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1, 2013, p. 89-109. 
It is not very certain whether the current African statesmen are sympathetic of NEPAD 
initiative. Regrettably, Thabo Mbeki, Abdoulaye Wade, Olusegun Obasanjo and Mohammed 
Hosni Mubarak, the initiators of NEPAD, are no longer in office as presidents9. On the other 
hand, Algeria’s President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the only one remaining NEPAD pillars still 
in power, has been preoccupied by recurrent political disorders in his country.10 Worse 
enough, Muammar Gaddafi, the AU’s renowned sponsor is no longer alive. It is sometimes 
tempting to believe that the foregoing leaders have moved out with ‘their’ NEPAD. 
 
Furthermore, “by embracing the tenets of the neo-liberal framework” (Kotze and Steyn, 2003: 
91) with the hope for sustainable development, NEPAD has probably followed the wrong 
path. A Kenyan politician-cum-scholar, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, cautioned about this 
earlier on: “… a poor man cannot negotiate equally with a man of property” (1967, 258). 
Consequently, NEPAD has been incapable of challenging the prevailing norms and rules 
within the World Trade Organization (WTO) which have long undermined Africa, and 
posed difficulties with trade access. Likewise, Samir Amin is correct in maintaining that 
underdevelopment in Africa is caused by the integration of the periphery into the world 
market, and is revealed by three features:  “(1) unevenness of productivity as between 
sectors, (2) disarticulation of the economic system, and (3) domination from outside” (Amin, 
1974: 15). NEPAD’s wrong proposition is trying to take Africa back to the same exploitative 
world market in line with the Washington Consensus. 
 
In his African “history of extraversion”, Jean-Francois Bayart (2000) holds that, most of the 
elites (bright intellectuals) have in effect been co-opted and confined by the World Bank and 
IMF as they are now awarded with  high salaries equal to those of international civil servants 
by celebrating the virtues of ‘civil society’ and ‘good governance’. Thabo Mbeki may not be 
exception. Thus, with such African elite posture, the future of the continent thus remains 
largely open. The continent will consistently be more or less a “free rider”, the majority of its 
people will mainly be “obliged to live from hand to mouth” (Bayart, 2000: 267). Quoting 
Jean-Paul Sartre in his preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, he asserts: 
 
The European elite undertook to manufacture a native [African] elite. They 
picked out promising adolescents; they branded them, as with a red-hot iron, 
with the principles of Western culture; they stuffed their mouths full with 
high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words that stuck to their teeth. After 
a short stay in the mother country [in Europe] they were sent home [back to 
Africa], whitewashed. These walking lies had nothing left to say to their 
brothers (Bayart, 2000: 264-265). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATION 
The African dream has remained a pipe dream for quite too long. Is NEPAD already 
beginning to lose momentum and interest among African analysts and, more importantly, 
among the African people? While hundreds of papers have been written on NEPAD, very 
                                               
9 Tanzania’s former President, Ben Mkapa, was also one of the staunch NEPAD initiators and supporters. 
10 During the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the (OAU) in 2013, Bouteflika was hospitalized of minor 
paralysis in France (a symptom of dependence on foreign solutions to African health problems). The only 
figure that had placed value on African medical infrastructure and facilities was the late Nelson Mandela; 
never had he been hospitalized outside his country–South Africa–despite his recurrent health problems. 
few are concerned with the implementation stages. As Taylor observes, there have been a 
number of African initiatives, like the African Human Rights Charter, to deal with the 
continent’s problems. Agreements and instruments have been approved, signed and even 
ratified, without being used effectively to deal with wars, human rights violations, genocide, 
and also with prevailing underdevelopment and poverty (Taylor, 2005: 7). There is a danger 
that NEPAD may gradually transform itself into being little more than a series of routine 
meetings and celebrative gatherings that accomplish little and do not attract the attention of 
many.  
 
NEPAD, like previous African development initiatives, has its shortcomings, but it also 
opens up new opportunities for creating a balanced relationship between the state and the 
market, promoting the capacity of state and civil society and increasing the autonomy of the 
state by combating corruption, widening democracy, and institute good governance. 
Theoretically NEPAD also opens doors to curbing corruption and impose economic reforms, 
but what is needed is political willingness and visionary leadership. Talking of economic 
reforms and combatting corruption, Cammack (2006: 343) puts it that African leaders 
instated “the reforms – on the economy and combatting corruption – that have been 
politically difficult”.  
 
In this regard, Africa needs to rethink how best to address the cost of attaining sustainable 
development. There are reasons why this issue is important. The first is that the misuse of 
resources limits Africa’s free will to decide on the strategic, operational and tactical aspects 
of development that it desires to carry out. The second reason is that because of the lack of 
public financial accountability that results in the inability to fund such initiatives itself, 
Africa ends up looking for donors. The quandary with this is that dependence on extra-
continental sources means that donors can effectively exercise a veto over which 
development programmes Africa should undertake, and in most cases their (donors) own 
national interests will guide their decisions. At critical moments, donors can decide on the 
scope of Africa’s development initiative, and can manipulate the mandate of the initiative by 
placing terms and conditions for continued funding, or by withdrawing funding if national 
interests take precedence over the African development initiative. And finally, financial 
resources provided are not only inadequate but also lack flexibility and certainty needed to 
sustain development efforts.  
 
Who should foot NEPAD bills? The question is how to mobilize internal funds for 
implementing NEPAD. The logic of political accountability should consist foremost of 
working towards downsizing plethoric, over-bloated and highly centralized bureaucracies 
that have proved economically and politically ruinous (Amuwo, 2002: 75). By so doing, 
Africa could free up funds for financing NEPAD. Overdependence on external funding for 
development is again and again held by African leaders to be a function of lack of resources 
in Africa. But is it true that Africa lacks resources? The answer to this question is ‘No’. We 
believe that African states have plenty of resources capable of generating their own wealth, 
redistributing prosperity, creating employment and reducing poverty on their own. Only 
what is needed urgently is to reduce the cost of politics and corruption (Ake, 2001: 8).  
 
There is also a need to reposition NEPAD from it current liberal framework to an African 
political economy framework. This approach addresses African problems in a way rooted in 
the historical complexities of African society. It is imperative for NEPAD policy to truly 
address the poor Africans’ problems in a way responsive to the needs and circumstances of 
the people. Hence, for the initiative to meaningfully address the problem of poverty, conflict 
and undemocratic governance, it must be a product of the people in the design and tailored 
to suit the plight of African poor in contrast to being a product of African elites and tailored 
along Western diagnostic prescription. NEPAD therefore, must be endogenous, people-
centered, pro-poor, inclusive of popular participation, in a way that the poor can reproduce 
themselves while not injuring the chances of future generation to meet their needs 
(Muhibbu-Din, 2011: 7). No true democracy and development can be attained without being 
inclusive and participatory. 
 
Besides, it is imperative now that incompetent leaders quit the corridors of power to pave 
way for dynamic and vibrant leadership. The time to live the African dream is now. African 
governments must concentrate on setting up infrastructure that will lift the living standards 
of the citizenry instead of concentrating on the so-called ‘new initiative’ paperwork. It is time 
the African dream was taken back from foreign capitals and donors and nurtured here in 
Africa. It is time African leaders invested in their countries instead of stashing money in their 
offshore bank accounts. It is high time it was legislated that Africa’s looted funds be 
repatriated back to Africa, used for the benefit of the African people, and the assets of 
individuals encouraging capital flight be frozen. Let us begin to live the African dream from 
today. 
 
The youths in Africa have already noticed the above discussed weaknesses, and it is likely 
that true African Renaissance is round the corner; it will come from the common people––the 
bottom-up sociopolitical movement. The movements that are on-the-go at the moment in 
Egypt, South Africa, Mali, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, 
Madagascar, and even Tanzania may bring about true change (African Renaissance) that is 
independent of the former colonial masters. What is professed here is that, there is no 
turning back. The recent Libyan political change is an exception as it was actually not a 
home-grown revolution; thus a subsequent revolution is underway, the movement of which 
is still precipitating. 
 
A case in point is Nigeria’s Delta State quasi-guerrilla struggle. This particular struggle is led 
by youth in the African sense of the word: people who have educational qualifications but 
who are without work … Similar phenomena occur in Africa around mining enclaves and 
plantations, such as in Tanzania, where artisanal miners are at war with foreign investors 
who have been the main beneficiaries from the privatization of the gold and other precious 
germ mining sites.11 The recent tragic explosions which took place in Mtwara and Lindi 
region in Tanzania early this year were the most appalling demonstrations of the importance 
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